The dilemma of modern psychology

Grimes & Mishlove [Jeffrey Mishlove: Philosophical Midwifery with Pierre Grimes. New Thinking Allowed, 26 October 2017.] pointed out that the drama of modern psychology is that it is concerned a lot with empiricism, but not with what is in their name, the ‘psyche’, meaning soul in Greek.  – Indeed, the soul is something which is not graspable through materialism and thus not through empiricism. So psychology is not the teaching of the soul, but as both stated correctly it is rather a science of behavior. As a result, I think we have to engage more philosophers working in institutions offering care for people, because reasoning through Socratic dialectic might support those who are in a personal crisis, looking for advance in their life and who need someone who listens and asks questions. Traditionally, philosophers were always concerned with the well-being of one’s soul and reflected ways for self-contemplation. So I think, philosophy is very important for a society. Thus, in my personal opinion, if you need advice, elaborate your concerns with a philosopher. (This does not mean that psychology is rubbish or bad at all, but they are simply overall concerned with other tasks – in my opinion – , than the name asserts on the surface. This does not mean, of course, that the discipline does not have the right to exist, but what they are doing is empirical analysis, not soul healing, and we should be aware of what psychology can (and does) offer and what it cannot (or does not right now) offer.)

Timo Schmitz, 22 April 2022.


3 thoughts on “The dilemma of modern psychology

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